Using U.S. data over the period 1971-2005, we identify a J-shaped relation between dividends and firm value. Top-dividend-payers tend to be valued higher than all other firms including nondividend-payers, while non-dividend-payers tend to be valued higher than low-dividend-payers. This J-shaped relation is fairly stable over time and robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity bias in the dividend-value relation. This time-invariant nonlinear dividend-value relation is at odds with the premise of the catering hypothesis that the dividend premium varies over time. We also find that a similar J-shaped relation is obtained in other major stock markets including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and U.K. Our evidence indicates that the ability of existing theories-such as the free-cash-flow and clientele hypotheses-to account for the cross-sectional dividend-value relation is rather poor.
Introduction
One of the central questions in corporate finance is whether dividends are relevant to firm value.
Miller and Modigliani (1961, MM hereafter) suggest that, in frictionless markets, all feasible dividend policies imply identical stockholder wealth, and so the choice among them is irrelevant.
Thus, their irrelevance theorem implies that investment policy alone determines stockholder wealth in frictionless markets. However, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) point out that MM's analysis is predicated critically on the assumption that firms pay out 100% of their free cash flows in every period. If we allow firms to retain some of their free cash flows, payout policy matters, particularly when the present value of distributions does not equal the present value of projected cash flows.
Empirical studies, such as those of Fama and French (1998) and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) , document that firm value is positively associated with the amount of dividends. These two studies offer different interpretations on this finding. Fama and French (1998) suggest that this association arises because dividends pick up information about future business prospects that is missed by control variables. On the other hand, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) interpret this association as evidence that investors assign high value to firms that reduce the agency costs of free cash flows by paying dividends. However, there are other studies that do not necessarily predict a positive relation between firm value and dividends. For example, according to the catering theory of Baker and Wurgler (2004) , the relation between firm value and dividends can be either positive or negative. These authors document that the dividend premium-the spread between the values of dividend-payers and non-dividend-payers-varies over time.
In this study, we examine the cross-sectional relation between firm value and dividends and thereby seek to tackle the question of whether dividends are relevant to firm value. In conducting our investigation, we depart from prior studies at least in two important respects.
First, we consider a potential nonlinear relation between dividends and firm value. Prior studies, such as Fama and French (1998) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006) , examine the presence of a linear dividend-value relation. However, some dividend hypotheses, e.g., the clientele hypothesis, may imply a nonlinear dividend-value relation. Assuming the demands by pro-dividend clienteles are concentrated in high-dividend-payers, their demands would push up the value of these highdividend-payers relative to other firms.
1 Similarly, the demands by anti-dividend clienteles would drive up the value of non-dividend-payers. If both pro-dividend and anti-dividend clienteles are present, high-dividend-payers and non-dividend-payers could be traded at a premium relative to low or medium-dividend-payers, thereby resulting in a nonlinear relation between dividends and firm value.
Second, the current study carefully addresses the potential endogeneity bias in the relation between dividends and firm value. Because prior studies, such as Fama and French (1998) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006) , do not take into account the potential endogeneity bias, there is a chance that the positive valuation effect of dividends in their results could be an outcome of reverse causation. For example, investors could award high-dividend-payers with high values, not because they pay high dividends per se, but because a set of firm characteristics associated with high dividends (e.g., cash-flow stability and high profitability) creates high firm value. We devise a scheme that allows us to examine the dividend-value relation after controlling for the potential endogeneity bias.
Our investigation of U.S. data over the period reveals that the relation between the amount of dividends (cash dividends scaled by total assets) and firm value (measured by Tobin's q) is not monotonic but J-shaped. On average, top-dividend-payers are valued highly in comparison to all other firms including non-dividend-payers, while nondividend-payers are valued higher than low-dividend-payers. This J-shaped dividend-value relation is fairly stable over time. For example, the median firm value for top-dividend-payers is greater than that for other firms including non-dividend-payers in every year, while the median firm value for non-dividend-payers is greater than that for low-dividend-payers in most sample years. Thus, it appears that the average value spread between top-dividend-payers and nondividend-payers does not vary in sign over time but is consistently positive.
We then assess whether the J-shaped dividend-value relation persists after controlling for the endogeneity bias. This is accomplished by evaluating the dividend-value relation within subgroups of firms in each of which firms have similar levels of expected dividend likelihood (or amount). If a similar J-shaped dividend-value relation is obtained in each of these subgroups, such relation could be viewed as evidence that actual dividends drive the J-shaped dividendvalue relation, rather than firm characteristics associated with dividends. The expected dividend likelihood for each firm is estimated from logit regression of the decision to pay dividends on previously identified determinants of dividends-e.g., cash-flow uncertainty, retained earnings,
and Wurgler (2004) , tend to lump all dividend-payers together in quantifying the value spread between dividend-spayers and non-dividend-payers.
profitability and firm size-as explanatory variables. We then sort firms into five subgroups by the expected dividend likelihood. Our results reveal that similar J-shaped dividend-value relations are obtained in these expected dividend likelihood subgroups. This implies that actual dividend payouts are responsible for the J-shaped dividend-value relation. For example, even among firms that are most likely to pay high (or low) dividends, investors appear to award highdividend-payers with highest firm values and also award no-dividend-payers with relatively
high firm values as compared to low-dividend-payers. In sum, the J-shaped dividend-value relation appears to persist after controlling for the potential endogeneity problem.
We also examine whether the J-shaped dividend-value relation persists when we include share repurchasing firms in the dataset. 2 We find that in all sample years, the median firm value for top-dividend-payers is greater than the corresponding values for other subgroups of firms. And in almost all years, the median firm value for non-dividend-payers is greater than that for lowest-divdend-payers. Thus, the data tell us that the J-shaped dividend-value relation is robust to inclusion of share repurchasing firms in the dataset.
For a further robustness check, we examine international data that are composed of six major economies-Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and U.K.-and two additional economies-Hong Kong and New Zealand. The two additional countries provide an invaluable opportunity to weigh whether the J-shaped pattern can be attributed partly to the tax-induced anti-dividend clientele, given that the dividend tax penalty does not exist under the tax system of these two countries (see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000) . Our investigation reveals that the J-shaped pattern is present in all of the eight countries, which suggests that the J-shaped pattern is not unique to the U.S. stock market. The results for Hong
Kong and New Zealand imply that the tax-induced anti-dividend clientele is unlikely to provide an explanation for the J-shaped dividend-value relation.
Based on our findings, we assess the ability of existing dividend hypotheses-in particular, the free-cash-flow and clientele hypotheses-to explain the observed J-shaped dividend-value relation. First, the free-cash-flow hypothesis maintains that firm value would be positively associated with dividends because investors assign high values to firms that reduce the agency costs of free cash flows by paying dividends. However, this hypothesis is unable to 2 One can presume that the valuation effect of share repurchases would be different from that of dividends due to the nonpermanent nature of share repurchases as documented in prior studies (e.g., Stephen and Weisbach, 1998; Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach, 2000; Guay and Harford, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Lee and Suh, 2009.) provide an explanation for the nonlinear nature of the empirical dividend-value relation. 3 In particular, our finding of the value premium commanded by non-dividend-payers relative to low-dividend payers is in direct conflict with the prediction of the free-cash-flow hypothesis.
Second, the clientele hypothesis could accommodate a potential nonlinear relation between value and dividends, at least in theory. The observed J-shaped dividend-value relation may indicate the presence of both pro-dividend and anti-dividend clienteles. That is, the demands of pro-dividend clientele drive up the value of high-dividend-payers and those of antidividend clientele push up the value of no-dividend-payers (to a lesser extent), thereby creating avoid non-dividend-payers, they prefer low-dividend-payers among dividend-paying firms.
Thus the empirical distribution of institutions' share ownership does not conform to the Jshaped dividend-value relation.
This study makes substantial contributions to the payout literature. In stark contrast to the importance of the question of whether dividends are relevant to firm value, there is a relative dearth of formal empirical investigation of this question in the recent literature. While some prior studies indicate that firm value is positively associated with dividends (Fama and French, 1998; Pinkowitz et al., 2006) , our evidence suggests that the valuation effect of dividends may be nonlinear. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) argue that the empirical dividend-value relation supports the free-cash-flow hypothesis, but our evidence suggests that the precise dividend-value relation is non-monotonic, unlike what is implied by the free-cash-flow hypothesis. Our evidence also suggests that if we measure the dividend premium by the mean value spread between topdividend-payers and non-dividend-payers, the dividend premium does not vary in sign over time but is always positive. This finding runs counter to the notion proposed by Baker and Wurgler 3 Another problem of the free-cash-flow hypothesis is that an alternative hypothesis, for example, a sizable pro-dividend clientele (who prefer high dividends), would generate a similar positive dividendvalue relation. In our view, the stronger test of the free-cash-flow hypothesis would be conducted by estimating the effect on firm value of the interaction of dividends and residual cash flows (defined by the difference between operating cash flows and investments), rather than estimating the effect of dividends per se.
(2004) that the dividend premium varies in sign over time. Nearly fifty years ago, MM (1961) asked, "Do companies with generous distribution policies consistently sell at a premium above those with niggardly payouts?" According to our evidence, the answer to this question is yes.
However, our evidence also indicates that existing dividend hypotheses fall short of providing a complete explanation for the observed J-shaped dividend-value relation.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section presents hypotheses.
Section 3 describes research design and data. Section 4 conducts empirical analyses and presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Hypotheses on the dividend-value relation
In this section, we present three key hypotheses about the cross-sectional relation between dividends and firm value: the free-cash-flow hypothesis, the dividend clientele hypothesis and the dividend catering hypothesis.
To begin, the free-cash-flow hypothesis predicts a positive relation between firm value and dividends. According to Jensen (1986) On the other hand, Fama and French (1998) do not provide an interpretation based on agency costs, although they find a similar positive impact of dividends on firm value in the value regression. They conjecture that this positive impact of dividends is a byproduct of the ability of dividends to predict future profitability (i.e., the key determinant of firm value)-combined with the lack of ability of the control variables in the value regression to sufficiently account for future profitability. This interpretation is akin to the signaling hypothesis of dividends, which posits that firms signal favorable future prospects by paying dividends (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985) . However, the signaling hypothesis pertains to the change in firm value in response to dividend changes, rather than to the cross-sectional dividend-value relation. Typically, the signaling hypothesis is tested by examining the announcement effects of dividend changes, i.e., whether those announcements give rise to significant stock price responses (e.g., Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Bajaj and Vijh, 1990; Denis, Denis Michael, Thaler and Womack, 1995) .
Second, the dividend clientele hypothesis does not necessarily predict a monotonic or linear relation between dividends and firm value. This hypothesis postulates that there exist several investor groups with varying preferences for current dividends vs. capital gain (i.e., future dividends) and that firms would design their dividend policy to satisfy the demands (MM, 1961; Black and Scholes, 1974) . Prior studies point to the tax code and behavioral biases as the source for the presence of these dividend clienteles. The anti-dividend clientele prefer nondividends because dividends are generally taxed at a higher rate than are capital gains and thus reduce shareholder wealth (Elton and Gruber, 1970) . The pro-dividend clienteles prefer high dividends for their naivety (Shefrin and Statman, 1984) or for the incentive to minimize transaction costs (MM, 1961) . Petitt (1977) provides evidence that investor demands for stocks are explained by proxy variables, such as age, for the dividend clientele effect. Bajaj and Vijh (1990) and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994) document that the stock price response to dividend change announcements is relatively more pronounced for high dividend-yield stocks, which suggest that pro-dividend investors make up a high proportion of marginal investors for high dividend-yield stocks.
This dividend clientele hypothesis can be extended to form predictions about the crosssectional relation between dividends and firm value. Suppose that firms may make incomplete supply adjustments and individuals' portfolio adjustments may be limited by transaction costs such as short sale and margin restrictions (MM, 1961; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy; 1980 , 1982 . Then the demand of pro-dividend clienteles for high dividend stocks could create value premiums for high-dividend-paying stocks. Similarly the demands of anti-dividend clienteles could create value premiums for non-dividend-paying stocks. In a nutshell, the relative significance of the demands of these clienteles would determine the cross-sectional dividendvalue relation.
Third, the dividend catering hypothesis proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004) assumes that the cross-sectional dividend-value relation would be rather unstable over time or time-varying. This hypothesis posits that firms determine their dividend policy, depending on whether dividend-paying stocks are under or overvalued relative to non-dividend-paying stocks. Baker and Wurgler (2004) document that more firms tend to initiate (omit) dividends in years during which the dividend premium-measured by the mean difference in firm value between dividend-payers and non-dividend-payers-is positive (negative). Note, however, that a key feature of the Baker and Wurgler (2004) study is that they treat all dividend paying firms as a single group, not sorting them into subgroups by the amounts of dividends.
In summary, the free-cash-flow hypothesis predicts a positive dividend-value relation.
According to this hypothesis, firm value is expected to increase monotonically with the amount of dividends, i.e., reduction in cash flows at managers' discretion. However, the dividend clientele hypothesis does not predict a monotonic relation between dividends and firm value because it presumes that the relative size of anti-dividend clienteles and pro-dividend clienteles would determine the dividend value relation. Finally, the dividend catering hypothesis predicts that the cross-sectional dividend-value relation may vary over time.
Research design and data
In examining the relation between firm value and dividends, we pay special attention to the possibility that this relation could be non-monotonic. Instead of trying to determine a linear relation (or lack thereof) between firm value and dividends, we compare firm values across different groups of firms classified by the amount of dividends. To do so, we partition each year's cross-section of firms into six groups by the amount of dividends. This is done by first partitioning firms into non-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 0) and dividend-payers. Then we further divide dividend-payers into five groups by the amount of dividends, DIV_ID = 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5,
with DIV_ID = 1 being the lowest-dividend-payers and DIV_ID = 5 being the highest-dividendpayers. The next step is to compare the mean and median firm values for these six groups.
We also estimate the valuation effect of dividends using the modified Fama-French Other explanatory variables include earnings before interest and extraordinary items but after depreciation and taxes (E t ), book value of total assets (A t ), R&D expenditures (RD t ), and interest expense (I t ). For a given explanatory variable, X t , dX t and dX t+1 indicate the one-year changes, X t − X t-1 and X t+1 − X t , respectively. dQ t+1 is the future change in firm value (Q) from t to t+1. This variable is included because firm value reflects expected future profitability but the other explanatory variables may not pick up expected future profitability sufficiently. All explanatory variables are scaled by total assets (A t ). Note that firm subscript i is suppressed for notational convenience.
The above value regression is similar to the one that is developed by Fama and French (1998). The major difference here is, however, that we treat the amount of dividends as a categorical variable in this regression in order to identify a potential nonlinear relation between firm value and dividends. Prior studies, such as Fama and French (1998) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006) , use the amount of dividends as a continuous variable. These authors find that the coefficient for dividends is significantly positive in the value regression.
Next we address the issue that the empirical dividend-value relation may reflect a potential endogeneity bias. The key to controlling for the endogeneity bias in this study is to estimate the dividend-value relation among firms that have similar levels of expected dividend likelihoods (or amounts). The first step in this task is to estimate the expected likelihood of paying dividends for each firm. We estimate the following cross-sectional logit regression for each year's dataset. 
The dependent variable is the log odd of paying dividends. The explanatory variables are lagged values of the standard deviation of five year operating profitability (ROAVOL), the retainedearnings-to-total-equity ratio (RETE), operating profitability (ROA), firm size (LOGTA), fiveyear sales growth (SGR5), cash holdings (CASH) and leverage (LEVER). 4 The definitions of these explanatory variables are provided in Table A .1. Because the explanatory variables are lagged values (i.e., t-1 values) of key firm characteristics, they reflect information available to investors prior to a firm's decision to (or not to) pay dividends at t. As a result, the estimated likelihoods from this regression model capture the investors' perception of the probability that dividends will be paid.
Once the expected dividend likelihood is obtained, we divide the sample firms each year into quintiles based on that likelihood (E(DIV)_ID = 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5) 5 such that firms in the same quintile have similar expected likelihoods of paying dividends (mainly because these firms have similar firm characteristics). The next step is to examine the relation between the amount of dividends and firm value in each expected dividend likelihood quintile. Essentially, this allows us to assess whether a firm enhances or destroys its value when it deviates from other firms with similar expected dividend likelihoods by paying high, low or no dividends. Or more importantly, this allows us to examine the extent to which actual dividend payouts-rather than firm characteristics associated with dividend payouts-affect firm value.
The dataset for this study is constructed using the Compustat database for the period 1971-2005. The dataset is comprised of non-financial firms. We measure the amount of dividends as the ratio of cash dividends to total assets. Our main findings remain unchanged when we use an alternative measure, the ratio of cash dividends to sales. When necessary, we present results only for the four representative years of 2005, 1995, 1985, and 1975 to save space, although our main findings are obtained for other sample years as well. We deal with extreme values by Winsorizing the variables in this study (whose definitions are provided in Table A .1.) at the top and bottom one percent of their own distributions in each year's sample.
We remove firms with negative book equity because those firms create a problem in the interpretation of the retained-earnings-to-total-equity ratio (RETE).
Finally, in our primary analysis, we drop firms if they repurchase shares during a given year in order to focus on the valuation effects of dividends. Given the nonpermanent nature of repurchases as documented in prior studies (e.g., Stephen and Weisbach, 1998; Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002) , repurchases would have potentially different valuation effects from dividends. Thus inclusion of repurchasing firms in the dataset could interfere with proper assessment of the valuation effect of dividends. However, our investigation is also conducted on the extended dataset that includes share repurchasing firms. The results for this extended dataset are reported in Section 4.4.
Empirical Results

The J-shaped relation between firm value and dividends
We begin by plotting the relation between firm value and dividends for the pooled dataset from the period 1971-2005. To do so, we sort each year's sample into six groups-DIV_ID = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5-by the amount of dividends. As explained above, DIV_ID = 0 indicates non-dividendpayers, while DIV_ID = 1 and DIV_ID = 5 indicate the lowest-dividend-payers and the highestdividend-payers, respectively, among dividend-paying firms. For a given year, we then calculate the median firm value (measured in Tobin's q) for each of these six groups of firms. For example, over the sample period, the median of the annual median firm values for nondividend-payers (DIV_ID = 0) is greater than the corresponding value for lowest-dividendpayers (DIV_ID = 1). Among dividend-payers (i.e., DIV_ID = 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5), the median of the annual median firm values tend to increase as we move from the lowest-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 1) to the highest-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 5). The most salient feature of the boxplot is that the median of the median firm values for the highest-dividend-payers is greater than that of any other firm group.
These observations based on the pooled dataset over the entire sample period suggest that there is a J-shaped relation between dividends and firm value. However, it is essential to asssess whether this relation is stable over time, especially in light of the dividend catering hypothesis that postulates that the dividend-value relation may vary from year to year. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2004) document that the dividend premium-the spread between the values of dividend-payers and non-dividend-payers-may turn negative. In their approach, however, they treat all dividend-payers as a single group, thereby dismissing the potential importance of dividend amounts in determining the dividend-value relation.
To evaluate the stability of the J-shaped dividend-value relation over time, Table 1 tabulates the median and mean values for Tobin's q for the six groups of firms from DIV_ID = 0 to 5 for each individual year over the period . The table shows that the J-shaped dividend-value relation is present in almost all individual years. That is, in almost all years, there is a tendency for non-dividend-payers to be valued higher than low-dividend-payers. And among dividend-payers, firm value tends to increase monotonically with the amount of dividends. In particular, this table shows that, in all years without exception, the median firm value for top-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 5) is greater than the corresponding values for other groups of firms including non-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 0). It also shows that, in almost all years (with only five exceptions), the median firm value for non-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 0)
is greater than that for lowest-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 1).
Thus, the data indicate that the J-shaped dividend-value relation is fairly stable over
time. What does this imply for the dividend catering hypothesis of Baker and Wurgler (2004)?
This hypothesis presumes that the value spread between dividend-payers and non-dividendpayers varies (i.e., change sign) over time. However, our findings suggest that lumping all dividend-payers together as a single group may not be appropriate if we intend to capture the complete dividend-value relation. It appears that it is essential to account for the amount of dividends in analyzing the dividend-value relation. The data show that top-dividend-payers are traded consistently at a premium over time relative to non-dividend-payers, while low-dividendpayers are traded consistently at a discount over time relative to non-dividend-payers. Thus, if
we take into account the amount of dividends, the observed dividend-value relation appear to be fairly stable over time-contrary to the premise of the catering hypothesis that this relation may vary over time.
Modified Fama-French value regression results
Next we estimate the modified Fama-French value regression given in equation (1) in order to assess the significance of the J-shaped dividend-value relation. Table 2 In sum, our regression results confirm that top-dividend-payers tend to be valued highly in comparison to other firms including non-dividend-payers. Non-dividend-payers, however, tend to be valued highly in comparison to low-dividend-payers. This J-shaped dividend-value relation suggests that inferences from the linear value regression models (employed by prior studies) may be misleading. In particular, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) concludes that the empirical dividend-value relation supports the free-cash-flow hypothesis on the basis of the finding that the coefficient for dividends is positive in their linear value regression. However, as our results suggest, firm value does not increase monotonically with dividends, a finding that does not conform to the prediction of the free-cash-flow hypothesis.
The dividend-value relation after controlling for the endogeneity bias
Thus far our results indicate a significant J-shaped relation between dividends and firm value.
However, one could raise a concern that the observed dividend-value relation may arise not from dividends per se but from a set of firm characteristics that affect both dividend decisions and firm value (that is, an endogeneity or self-selection bias). For example, according to the observed J-shaped relation, top-dividend-payers tend to be valued higher than other firms. This pattern could be an outcome of a tendency of high-valued firms to pay high dividends-if such tendency exists. In order to address the potential endogeneity problem, we divide our sample firm-years into several subgroups in each of which firms have similar levels of expected dividend likelihood (or amounts) and then evaluate the dividend-value relation in each of these subgroups. If similar J-shaped dividend-value relations are obtained in all of these subgroups, it would be an indication that such relation is robust to the potential endogeneity bias.
The first step in this robustness check is to estimate the expected likelihood of paying dividends for each firm-year using the logit regression model (2). In the second step, we sort firm-years into five subgroups by expected dividend likelihood (i.e., E(DIV)_ID = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
The final step involves examining the cross-sectional value-dividend relation in each of these five subgroups. In summary, our investigation reveals that actual dividend payouts-not just expected dividend payouts-are responsible for the J-shaped dividend-value relation. For example, even among firms that are expected to pay high (or low) dividends, investors appear to award highdividend-payers with highest firm values and also award no-dividend-payers with relatively high firm values as compared to low-dividend-payers. The J-shaped dividend-value relation tends to persist after controlling for expected dividend likelihoods, which suggests that this relation is quite robust to the potential endogeneity problem.
The dividend-value relation after including share repurchasing firms in the dataset
Thus far our investigation has not included share repurchasing firms because our focus is on the valuation effect of dividends. However, given that the number of share repurchasing firms has been on the rise over our sample period (See, e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2002) , it is necessary to address the question of whether our main findings are affected by exclusion of share repurchasing firms. To the best of our knowledge, the valuation effect of share repurchases is not clear, especially given that share repurchases are not long-term commitments to distributing cash to shareholders. For example, share repurchases are not persistent and the amount of share repurchases varies widely from year to year (Stephen and Weisbach, 1998; Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Lee and Suh, 2009 ). In addition, Guay and Harford (2000) document evidence that firms use share repurchases to distribute temporary cash flows. Given this nonpermanent nature of share repurchases, it is not likely that they have sustained effects on firm value. Table 6 reports the dividend-value relation for each individual year over the sample period for an extended dataset that includes share repurchasing firms along with the dividendpaying and non-dividend-paying firms examined in the preceding analyses. Our key question is whether a J-shaped dividend-value relation persists for this extended dataset. Inspection of the table suggests that that is the case. In all sample years without exception, the median value for top-dividend-payers (i.e., DIV_ID = 5) is greater than the corresponding values for all other subgroups of firms. It also shows that, in almost all years (with only five exceptions), the median firm value for non-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 0) is greater than that for lowest-
dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 1). A similar pattern is found for the dividend-value relation in terms of mean firm values (as reported in Panel B)
. Thus, the data tell us that the J-shaped dividend-value relation is robust to inclusion of share repurchasing firms in the dataset. 
International evidence
We now examine stock markets outside the U.S. to evaluate whether the J-shaped dividendvalue relation can be extended to other stock markets. Our international dataset covers the period 1994-2005 for eight stock markets: six major markets including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and U.K. and two additional markets including Hong Kong and New
Zealand. This international dataset is constructed using the data from the Worldscope database.
The two additional markets are considered here because they provide an interesting opportunity to assess the role of taxes in generating the J-shaped dividend-value relation. The dividend tax penalty does not exist in these two countries (see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000), which implies that the tax-induced anti-dividend clientele would be nonexistent in those countries. We hypothesize that if the tax-induced anti-dividend clientele is responsible for the value premium of non-dividend-payers relative to low-dividend-payers (a pattern obtained for the U.S. stock market), this value premium would disappear for those two countries.
The results presented in Table 7 strongly suggest that the J-shaped dividend-value 6 We also analyze the dividend-value relation after controlling for the probability of paying dividendsin the same manner as in Table 5 -for this extended dataset. We find that a J-shaped dividend-value relation is obtained in each subgroup of firms classified by the likelihood of paying dividends.
relation is not unique to the U.S. stock market. In all eight countries, there is a clear J-shaped relation between firm value and dividends. For example, in Australia, the median value for the annual median firm values for non-dividend-payers (i.e., DIV_ID = 0) is 1.358, which is greater than the corresponding value for low-dividend-payers (i.e. DIV_ID = 1) at 1.065. The median firm value increases monotonically among dividend-payers as we move to medium-and highdividend-payers. As a results, top-dividend-payers command high firm values relative to other groups of firms. Similar patterns are observed for other countries as well. In particular, note that the results from Hong Kong and New Zealand suggest that the tax-induced dividend clientele may not be attributable to the value premium of non-dividend-payers relative to low-dividendpayers. In spite of the fact that the dividend tax penalty is non-existent in those countries, there is a substantial value premium of non-dividend-payers relative to low-dividend-payers in those countries; both mean and median firm values for non-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 0) are greater than those for lowest-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 1). 
Discussion of several issues
According to the J-shaped dividend-firm value relation, the average firm value of non-dividendpayers is greater than that of low-dividend-payers. One might argue that this relatively high firm value of non-dividend-payers could be explained by the observation that non-dividend-payers are clustered in the technology sector and their retained earnings are typically negative (See, e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 2004) . Indeed, firms with negative retained earnings could assume high q values, not because investors award these firms with high firm values, but because negative retained earnings lower the denominator of the q value. However, we still find that a J-shaped relation persists after removal of negative earnings firms (in unreported results).
Also, we note that some of our earlier results imply the robustness of the J-shaped relation to the presence of negative earnings firms: a significant J-shaped value dividend relation persists even within subgroups of firms with high expected dividend likelihood (e.g., E(DIV)_ID = 4 or 5)-i.e., essentially, firms with non-negative retained earnings.
In light of the J-shaped dividend-value relation in a cross-section of firms, an interesting question to pose is whether this pattern implies that firms can enhance value by changing the amount of dividends (or, in other words, whether this pattern implies the valuation effect of dividend changes). For example, could low-dividend-payers raise value by increasing dividends to become medium-and high-dividend-payers? A particularly puzzling observation in our results is the relatively low average value of low-dividend-payers as compared to nondividend-payers. Does this observation imply that firm value would actually drop when firms initiate dividends-assuming that dividend initiating firms become low-dividend-payers, not medium-or high-dividend-payers? In unreported results, we examine whether firms experience significant changes in firm value over the three-year period if they move from a given dividend payout subgroup (e.g. DIV_ID = 0) to another (e.g., DIV_ID = 1). We find that the changes in firm value following dividend changes are not statistically significant. Thus it does not appear that the cross-sectional J-shaped dividend-value relation implies the significant valuation effect of dividend changes.
However, the lack of valuation effect of dividend changes is not in conflict with existing evidence reported in the dividend literature. Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) document that dividend increases are not followed by significant earnings growth in subsequent years. Given that earnings are the main driver of firm value, their finding indicates that dividend increases would be not be followed by significant improvements in firm value. Furthermore, some prior studies provide little evidence that changes in dividend policy attract or drive off a particular investor clientele. For example, Hoberg and Prabhala (2008) report that institutional ownership does not change significantly after dividend increases (See DeAngelo et al., 2008 , for a review of this strain of research). The relatively weak response in investor demands to dividend changes suggests that the valuation effect of dividend changes would be rather smallat least over a short period of time.
Concluding remarks
In this study, we investigate the cross-sectional relation between dividends and firm value. The data show that there is a J-shaped relation between firm value and dividends. On average, highdividend-payers are valued higher than all other firms including non-dividend-payers, but nondividend-payers are valued higher than low-dividend-payers. It appears that this J-shaped relation is fairly stable over time and robust to controlling for a potential self-selection bias.
The time-invariant nature of this J-shaped relation cases doubt on the premise of the catering theory that the dividend premium varies over time.
Our tests show that the ability of existing hypotheses, such as the free-cash-flow hypothesis and the dividend clientele hypothesis, to explain the J-shaped pattern is rather poor.
For example, the free-cash-flow hypothesis is unable to offer an explanation for the nonlinear nature of the empirical dividend-value relation, more specifically, the value premium of nondividend-payers relative to low-dividend payers. We acknowledge that the J-shaped dividendvalue relation does not imply rejection of the free-cash-flow hypothesis. At a minimum, however, the J-shaped relation suggests that there is more to the cross-sectional relation between firm value and dividends than is explained by the free-cash-flow hypothesis.
Second, our J-shaped pattern may be resulted from the demands of the two dividend clienteles; pro-dividend clienteles push up the value of high-dividend-payers, while antidividend clienteles push up the value of non-dividend-payers to a lesser degree. However, prior research offers little empirical evidence for the importance of dividend clienteles (See, e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 2008) . Furthermore, our own international evidence suggests that tax-induced anti-dividend clienteles may not be an explanation for the value premium commanded by non-dividend-payers relative to low-dividend-payers.
In conclusion, it appears that dividend policy matters to firm value, for example, as indicated by a substantial value premium commanded by top-dividend-payers. On the other hand, it is not clear what drive the J-shaped dividend-value relation, given the failure of existing hypotheses to provide a complete explanation for this observed relation. It is not clear either that the J-shaped relation implies that firms can influence its value by modifying their dividend policies. These questions present interesting yet challenging venues for future research. Lagged value of the standard deviation of operating rate of return (i.e., EBIT/total assets) over the most recent five years Retained-earnings-to-total-equity ratio (RETE)
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Lagged value of (short-term debt + long-term debt)/total assets B, respectively) for six groups of firms classified by the amount of dividends. Each year's sample is partitioned into non-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 0) and dividend-payers. Dividend-payers are further partitioned into five groups by the amount of dividends, with DIV_ID = 1 being the lowest-dividendpayers and DIV_ID = 5 being the highest-dividend payers. In Panel C, *, ** and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Table 4 Tobin's q and other key firm characteristics for each expected dividend quintile
The table reports the median values for Tobin's q and other key firm characteristics for firms in each expected dividend quintile (E(DIV)_ID = 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5). Firms in a higher quintile (e.g., E(DIV)_ID = 5) are more likely to pay dividends than those in a lower quintile (e.g., E(DIV)_ID = 1). The likelihood of paying dividends (E(DIV)_ID) is estimated based on the logit regression results (as reported in Table 3 ). The definitions of the firm characteristic variables are provided in Table 5 Median and mean Tobin's q for DIV_ID = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 in expected dividend likelihood quintiles
The table reports the median and mean Tobin's q for thirty subgroups of firms for four representative years as well as for the entire sample years over 1971-2005. To construct this table, we first split each year's sample into quintiles by the expected likelihood of paying dividends (E(DIV)_ID) that is estimated from the logit regression (as reported in Table 3 ). Firms in a higher quintile (e.g., E(DIV)_ID = 5) are more likely to pay dividends than those in a lower quintile (e.g., E(DIV)_ID = 1). For a given dividend likelihood quintile each year, we partition firms into non-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 0) and dividend-payers. We further partition dividend-payers into five groups by the amount of dividends, with DIV_ID = 1 being the lowest-dividend-payers and DIV_ID = 5 being the highest-dividend payers. In the last panel (marked ALL), the reported numbers are the median values of median or mean Tobin's q for individual years over 1971-2005. N Table 2 except that share repurchasing firms are added to the dataset here. Each year's sample is partitioned into non-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 0) and dividend-payers. Dividend-payers are further partitioned into five groups by the amount of dividends, with DIV_ID = 1 being the lowestdividend-payers and DIV_ID = 5 being the highest-dividend payers. In Panel C, *, ** and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Table 7 Dividend-value relation for eight stock markets outside the U.S. In creating this box-plot, each year's sample is partitioned into non-dividend-payers (DIV_ID = 0) and dividend-payers. Dividend-payers are further partitioned into five groups by the amount of dividends, with DIV_ID = 1 being the lowest-dividendpayers and DIV_ID = 5 being the highest-dividend payers. For each individual year over the sample period, we then calculate the median Tobin's q for each of the six groups. The box-plot is constructed based on those median Tobin's q's. For example, for a given firm group, the center horizontal line in each box is the median of the thirty-five annual medians for that group. Similarly, the bottom and top of each box are the 25 th and 75 th percentiles. The high and low ends of each whisker are the maximum and minimum.
